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Abstract 
 
An attempt is made to estimate a state space model of investment and borrowing in 
a Bayesian framework and extract the unobservable agency cost of Japanese firms by 
firm size. Our estimates of the agency cost exhibited a declining trend in the late 80s 
and then switched to an increasing trend in the 90s. We pin down the driving force of 
agency cost to be the market value of land. Furthermore, we find that investment and 
borrowing behavior of small firms is very much affected by their agency cost in the late 
80s and the 90s. Our evidence demonstrates that imperfection of capital market is 
notable for small firms in Japan.                    
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1.Introduction 
In the presence of asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers, 
financial arrangements arise to prevent borrowers from acting contrary to the interests 
of lenders. In addition, lenders can monitor the behavior of borrowers to enforce such 
arrangements. The resulting agency cost caused by this inefficiency drives a wedge 
between the cost of internal and external funds, known as external finance premium. 
The agency cost or external finance premium reflects the creditor’s cost of collecting 
the debtor’s information and monitoring the debtor’s behavior and the cost arising from 
lemon problem or moral hazard problem. The premium for external funds influences the 
cost of external funds and thereby affects investment of the debtor.  
It is frequently asserted that excessive fluctuations of investment by Japanese 
firms in the late 1980s to the 90s are mainly caused by change in external finance 
premium of the corresponding period. As is well known, the external finance premium 
is inversely associated with the borrower’s collateralizable net worth. In particular, real 
estate had played a collateral role in Japan, under the expectation that land prices would 
never fall. In fact, land price soared in the late 80s when investment increased 
noticeably and as land price plummeted in the 90s, investment activity became stagnant.  
Plausible as this story sounds, it is quite difficult to demonstrate in a rigorous 
manner that this story was indeed true. The main obstacle in conducting empirical study 
along this line is unobservability of agency cost facing borrowers. Therefore in the past 
studies some kind of proxy was used to represent the movement of agency cost. One 
popular candidate is land asset of firms at market price. There are a number of studies to 
show a positive correlation of investment with land assets.1 However, it may be 
possible to interpret the land value of firms as future profitability of investment rather 
than collateral to alleviate the agency cost.  
In this study we give more direct evidence for the role of the agency cost in 
explaining the investment activities of Japanese firms in the late 1980s to 90s. This can 
be accomplished by estimating the unobservable agency cost directly by estimating the 
state space model by the Kalman filter in a Bayesian framework to extract the common 
factors from the observable variables closely related to the agency cost.2 As far as the 
authors know, this is a first attempt to estimate the agency cost the Japanese firms faced 
in the turmoil period of the late 80s to the 90s.  
In the course of conducting our research, we take account of the possibility that 
                                                        
1 Foe example, see Ogawa et al. (1996), Suzuki and Ogawa(1997), Ogawa and Suzuki(1998, 2000).   
2 Our idea of extracting agency cost stems from Stock and Watson(1991) where an unobservable 
composite index is extracted from comovement among economic variables.  
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the firms with different size might face different magnitude of agency cost. It is because 
there exists institutional device in Japan that helps to narrow the informational 
asymmetry between lenders and borrowers: industry groups known as keiretsu. Firms 
within a keiretsu are able to reduce agency costs for several reasons. First, they have 
close ties with affiliated banks, which hold both debt and equity in the group’s firms.  
This reduces conflicts among investors. Secondly, group firms enjoy long-term, stable 
relationships with their affiliated banks. Bank employees often hold management 
positions in the firms. This explains why agency costs were lower for firms within 
keiretsu groups in comparison to unaffiliated firms. Since large firms tend to be 
affiliated with banks, we can compare the magnitude of agency cost and its impact on 
investment activities by using the less aggregated firm data classified by firm size. 
Let us preview our findings. We find that the agency cost decreased in the late 
80s when the land price soared, while the agency cost increased substantially in the 90s 
when the land price precipitated. This pattern of agency cost is observed irrespective of 
firm size and industry. Furthermore, we find that investment and borrowing are closely 
associated with the agency cost, which in turn is affected negatively by the land value of 
firms. As for the effect of agency cost on investment and borrowings, it is noticeably 
large for small firms in the 90s. Our results are consistent with the theoretical verdict of 
the agency cost literature, indicating that investment activities of Japanese firms in the 
turbulent period of the late 80s to the 90s are successfully explained by the changing 
pattern of agency cost.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the agency cost 
model of investment and derives the fundamental equations to be estimated. Then the 
model is cast into state space form. Section 3 explains the econometric procedure to 
estimate unobservable agency cost. Section 4 describes the data set and shows some 
descriptive statistics of the variables used in the subsequent analysis. In Section 5 we 
present estimated series of agency cost and discuss the association of the agency cost 
with investment, borrowings, land asset and interest rate premium of firms. Concluding 
remarks are given in Section 6. 
 
2. Agency Cost Model of Investment and Borrowing   
We construct a model of corporate investment and borrowing with agency cost 
or external finance premium explicitly taken into consideration. The model consists of 
four equations: investment equation, borrowing equation, land asset equation, and 
interest rate spread equation. Agency cost is a key variable of each equation. A brief 
explanation is made on each equation of the model.   
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It is well known that marginal profitability of investment or marginal q is a 
sufficient statistics of investment under perfect capital market when a firm incurs an 
extra convex cost in adjusting investment. 3 However, once we relax the assumption of 
perfect capital market and incorporate the asymmetric information between lenders and 
borrowers into the model, marginal q is no longer sufficient statistics of investment and 
the degree of asymmetry or the magnitude of agency cost matters for investment 
decision.4 The upshot is that the factors to affect the agency cost enter the investment 
function as an additional explanatory variable. For example, cash flow or land as 
collateral can be a popular candidate besides marginal q in investment function. 
Moreover, the manner in which cash flow or land affects investment differs across firms 
with different agency cost structure. It has been asserted that the structure of agency 
cost depends on the firms’ attributes. For example, Fazzari et al.(1988) shows that the 
effect of cash flow on investment depends on the age of firm. Hoshi et al.(1991) 
demonstrates that the impact of cash flow on investment hinges upon whether a firm is a 
member of industrial group or not. Himmelberg et al. (1999) shows that the ownership 
of the firm affects the impact of cash flow on investment.  
We specify investment equation as a function of marginal q and unobservable 
agency cost.  
ttt
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where It : real investment in period t 
 Kt : capital stock at the end of period t 
 qt : marginal q in period t 
 tAC : agency cost in period t 
t1ε  : error term in period t.  
 
The agency cost, defined as the difference between the cost of internal finance 
and external finance, affects the level of borrowing. When the agency cost is low, a firm 
has more incentive to increase borrowing. Therefore we express the ratio of borrowing 
to capital stock or borrowing ratio as a function of agency cost as well as marginal q.             
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3 See Hayashi(1982).  
4 See Hubbard(1998) for a survey of investment behavior under imperfect capital market. 
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where tB∆ : increment of borrowings in period t 
1−t
I
t Kp : capital stock at replacement cost at the end of period t-1. 
t2ε : error term in period t. 
 
     The agency cost is inversely associated with the collateralizable net worth of the 
firm. In particular land asset had long played a collateral value in Japan under the 
expectation that land price would never fall. However, close association of borrowing 
with land asset made loans insolvent once land price plummeted in the 90s.   
  Therefore we regard land asset as a proxy of collateralizable net worth and express 
the agency cost as a function of the ratio of land asset to tangible asset (land asset plus 
capital stock). The following equation is a relationship between the ratio of land stock to 
tangible asset and the agency cost.  
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where 1−t
L
t Lp : land stock evaluated at market price at the end of period t-1.     
                 t3ε : error term in period t 
                   
The interest rate spread between the borrowing interest rate and the risk-free rate 
directly reflects the magnitude of agency cost, so that the interest rate spread is written 
as an increasing function of the agency cost.  
 
           ttt ACspread 444 εγα ++=                            (4) 
 
where tspread : the interest rate spread between the borrowing interest 
rate and the risk-free rate in period t.  
                t4ε : error term in period t 
 
      Now we have four equations relating the agency cost to investment, borrowings, 
land asset and interest rate spread. To close the model, we need the equation to describe 
the movement of agency cost. We assume that the agency cost is generated by a fourth 
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order AR process. 5  
 tttttt ACACACACAC νφφφφ ++++= −−−− 44332211              (5) 
                where tν : error term distributed as ( )1,0 Niid  
It is assumed that this transition equation is stationary.6  
Now we are ready for casting our model into state space form. The state space 
model consists of measurement equations and transition equation. The measurement 
equation is defined as an equation in which unobserved variable explains observed 
variables. In our model measurement equations correspond to eq.(1) to (4). 
Measurement equation is summarized as follows: 
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             where ( )2,0 : iti Niid σε  
Note that marginal q is exogenous in our model. The transition equation is the one to 
describe the movement of unobservable variable. Eq.(5) is the transition equation in our 
model. Note that the variance of innovation tv  in the transition equation is normalized 
to be unity in order to identify the other parameters and agency cost. In the state space 
model we estimate an unobservable agency cost as well as the other parameters and the 
error variances underlying the model. Explanations of statistical tool we use are now in 
order.     
 
3. Econometric Procedure to Estimate the State Space Model  
The agency cost in eq.(1) to (5) is an unobserved variable. The main feature of 
our paper is to estimate this unobservable variable by extracting the common factor 
from the co-movement of four observable variables: investment rate, borrowing ratio, 
ratio of land to tangible asset and interest rate spread. This common factor is identified 
as the estimate of agency cost. To estimate the co-movement, the Kalman filter 
technique is adopted. It is the algorithm of estimating unobserved variable or state 
                                                        
5 The choice of lag length is partially motivated by the quarterly data set we use.   
6 Agency cost model represented by eqs.(5) and (6) is analyzed by Uchiyama (2002), where 
selection of lag order and non-stationarity test (structural change test) of eq. (5) is conducted by 
Bayes factor. 
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variables from Gaussian linear state space model.7  
Since relatively small sample is dealt with in this study and we estimate a 
number of parameters and extract the unobservable series of agency cost from the state 
space model, the Bayesian approach would be appropriate. In a Bayesian framework the 
parameters and the agency cost are all treated as unobservable random variables to be 
inferred from observable data. We use the Gibbs sampler, one of the Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation techniques to obtain the parameters to characterize 
the marginal distribution from conditional distribution.8  
 
Bayesian Inference via Gibbs Sampler  
     In Bayesian inference the estimates such as the means and standard deviations of 
parameters are derived from their marginal posterior distributions which consist of their 
prior distributions and sample likelihood as follows.  
 
         ( )
)(
)|()(|
Yp
YLpYp θθθ =           
where p(θ| Y) : posterior density of parametersθ  
Y: sampled data  
 p(θ) : prior density ofθ 
 L(θ | Y ) : likelihood function 
 p(Y) : marginal density of Y  
 
To find the marginal posterior distributions from the given conditional 
posterior distributions, Gibbs sampler is carried out. The procedure of Gibbs sampler in 
the state space model is developed by Carter and Kohn (1994).9 When their Gibbs 
sampler is applied to our model, the procedure can be divided into four steps.10 In the 
following steps we denote the j-th iteration by superscript j.  
 
Step 1. Generate ACt(j)  for t = 1, 2, 3, …, T. 
We derive means,
)( j
tAC , and variances, )( jACtΣ , of ACt for t = 1, 2, 3, …, T from 
                                                        
7 See Hamilton (1994) for the detailed explanations of the algorithm of Kalman filter. 
8 See Casella and George (1992) for the comprehensive survey of the Gibbs sampler 
9 They propose the multi-move method of Kalman filter via Gibbs sampler. Their method is 
efficient and the speed of convergence is faster than the single-move method. 
10 See Carter and Kohn (1994) and Kim and Nelson (1999) for more detailed explanations on 
this procedure. 
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Kalman filter using parameters in the (j-1)-th iteration, and generate each ACt(j) from 
normal distribution with means
)( j
tAC and variances )( jACtΣ , i.e.,  
 { ACt(j )  | )1( −jγ , )1( −jβ , )1(2 −jσ , )1( −jφ  }～N ( )( jtAC  , )( jACtΣ   ) 
 
Step 2.  Generate )( jγ  and )( jβ  in measurement equations.  
We generate the coefficients, )( jγ , )( jβ , of measurement equations from normal 
distribution conditional on ACt and other parameters, )1(2 −jσ , )1( −jφ , i.e.,  
  {  )( jγ , )( jβ | )1(2 −jσ , )1( −jφ  , ACt(j)  }～N ( ( (j)γ , )( jβ ) , )( ),( j βγΣ  ) 
 
Step 3.  Generate )( jφ  in the transition equation.   
We generate the coefficients,φ(j), of transition equation from the truncated 
normal distribution conditional on ACt  and other parameters, i.e.,  
 {  )( jφ | )1(2 −jσ , )( jγ , )( jβ , , ACt(j)  }～N ( )( jφ  , )( jφΣ  ) )]([1 φs  
where )]([1 φs  : indicator function to return unity if the roots of 0)( =Lφ  lie 
outside the unit circle, otherwise zero. 11 
 
Step 4.  Generate )(2 jσ  in the measurement equations. 
    We generate the variances, )(2 jσ ,of measurement equations from the inverted 
gamma distribution conditional on ACt and other parameters, i.e.,  
{  )(2 jσ  | )( jγ , )( jβ , )( jφ  , ACt(j)  }～IG ( v, )(2 jσ  ) 
where v : posterior degree of freedom. 
 
By iterating these four steps, the conditional distribution of each parameter 
converges to the invariant marginal distribution independent of the other parameters. 
The sample extracted from converged distribution shapes the posterior marginal 
distribution, and the parameter estimators are obtained from this sample. As for the 
priors, we use noninformative ones for all the parameters but error variances. In this 
study, the first 1000 iterations of Gibbs sampler is discarded for convergence, and the 
next 5000 iterations are taken as our sample. A sequence of iterative steps converged 
after 1000 iterations based on a diagnostic proposed by Geweke (1992). Since the 
                                                        
11 This truncated normal distribution is adopted to guarantee the stationarity of the transition 
equation. 
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sample has auto-correlation, the variance formed directly from the sample tends to be 
overestimated. To reduce the auto-correlation, we re-form the posterior distribution 
from the means of each 10 successive elements of the original sample with 5000 
elements. 12  Accordingly, 500 sample elements are obtained from this re-formed 
sample, and we derive the means, standard deviations, medians and the 95% posterior 
probability bands (2.5%-th and 97.5%-th values of the sample) from this new sample.      
 
Comparison across Different Firm Groups  
Since the variance of innovation of the agency cost is normalized as unity in 
each firm group, comparison of the agency cost across different firm groups is not 
necessarily rigorous. Therefore, we adopt the following strategy. We compute the extent 
to which the agency cost affects four observable variables: investment rate, borrowing 
ratio, ratio of land asset to tangible asset and interest rate spread by multiplying the 
estimated series of the agency cost by the corresponding coefficient ( 1γ , 2γ , 3γ , 4γ ) 
of each measurement equation for each firm group. This exercise helps us to see how 
closely each four observable variable is associated with the agency cost. As for the 
effect of land asset on the agency cost, we multiply the ratio of land stock to tangible 
asset, )( 111 −−− + tIttLttLt KpLpLp , by the reciprocal of its coefficient ( 3γ ) in eq. (3).  
 
4. Data Construction and Descriptive Analysis  
We use quarterly data reported in the Quarterly Report of Financial Statements 
of Incorporated Business (QRFS) of the Ministry of Finance. The QRFS produces 
quarterly reports for manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms on major items from 
their balance sheets and profit and loss statements, disaggregated by firm size. The 
virtue of this data source is the decomposition of tangible fixed assets into components 
and we can construct a time series of land stock, which plays an important role in our 
analysis. Our sample period includes the first quarter of 1975 through to the first quarter 
of 1998, covering the long booms and the severe recessions in the 1980s and the 90s.  
     We measure firm size by capital. Firms are categorized into three groups by their 
level of equity capital: small, medium, and large firms. Small firms have under ¥ 100 
million yen in capital, medium firms have between ¥ 100 and ¥ 1000 million yen in 
capital, and large firms have over ¥ 1000 million yen in capital.  
 
                                                        
12 It is referred to as batch mean. 
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Data Construction  
    The discontinuity of the time series is one major problem of the QRFS. This arises 
from a complete renewal of the corporations in the sample every April, after which the 
sample is fixed for one year. It is necessary to adjust for this discontinuity in a 
consistent manner. Fortunately, the survey contains the values of main balance sheet 
items at the beginning and end of each period covered in the sample. This implies that 
we can compute the time series of flow variables in a consistent manner. Once the flow 
series is computed, the perpetual inventory method can be applied to construct the stock 
series. See Ogawa(2000b) for the detailed procedures for constructing the consistent 
data series.  
 
Descriptive Analysis of Major Variables in the Firm’s Balance Sheet 
     Let us first describe the characteristics of major variables used in our analysis. 
Table 1 to 4 shows the sample means of investment rate, rate of change in total 
borrowing, rate of change in land stock at market price and marginal q, respectively, 
over the whole sample period as well as three subperiods. They are the second quarter 
of 1975 to the fourth quarter of 1986, the first quarter of 1987 to the first quarter of 
1991, and the second quarter of 1991 to the first quarter of 1998. The second subperiod 
corresponds to the long booms (Heisei Keiki) in the late 80s when the land price 
exhibited an upward trend. In the third subperiod the land price plummeted, plunging 
the Japanese economy into stagnancy.     
     The sample average of the gross investment rate, given in Table 1, is highest in 
the second subperiod and lowest in the third subperiod for manufacturing as well as 
non-manufacturing industries. The volatility of fixed investment is highest among small 
firms for both manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries.  
     The average rate of change in total borrowing, given in Table 2, is highest in the 
second subperiod except for large firms in manufacturing industries. It is highest for 
small firms of non-manufacturing industries. The average rate of change amounts to 
4 % per quarter or 16 % per annum. By contrast the average rate of change is negative 
for large firms in manufacturing industries except for the third subperiod. This might 
reflect a shift of financing from bank loans to equity or bond for large manufacturing 
firms.  
     Table 3 gives the sample average of the rate of change in land stock at market 
price. There is no discernible difference across firm groups. The reason is as follows. 
The change in land stock is decomposed into two factors: increment or decrement of 
land stock in real terms and change in land price common to all firms. Close movements 
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of the change in land stock across firm size hints that the latter component dominates. 
The average rate of change in land stock is highest in the second subperiod and lowest 
in the third subperiod.  
Finally Table 4 gives the sample average of marginal q. Marginal q is constructed 
by estimating a VAR model of profit rate and discount rate, as is originally developed 
by Abel and Blanchard (1986).13  It should be noted that marginal q of small firms is 
much larger than that of medium or large firms. 
 
5. Estimates of Agency Cost and Their Association with Firms’ Activities 
     Four measurement equations relating the agency cost to investment, borrowing, 
land asset and interest rate spread, along with transition equation of the agency cost, are 
estimated in a Bayesian context by Kalman filter technique for three firm groups (small, 
medium and large firms) of manufacturing as well as non-manufacturing industries. 
Overall the estimation results support the theoretical supposition that agency cost is 
important especially for small firms that are likely to be constrained in capital market.14  
The response of investment to agency cost is negative and significant in the sense 
that the 95 % band does not include zero, irrespective of firm size and industry. The 
smaller the firms are, the larger the mean response of investment to agency cost is in 
absolute value. In other words, investment of small firms is more sensitive to agency 
cost. The response of borrowings to agency cost is also negative and significant except 
for large firms of manufacturing industries. The response of borrowing is larger in 
absolute value for smaller firms, which implies that borrowings of small firms are much 
more affected by agency cost. The collateral role of land in alleviating agency cost, 
measured by the reciprocal of 3γ , is also successfully estimated irrespective of firm size 
and industry. An increase of land value at market value reduces the agency cost. The 
effect of agency cost on interest rate spread is positive and significant except for small 
firms in non-manufacturing industries. The interest rate of large firms seems to reflect 
the agency cost quite accurately.  
    As for the effect of marginal q on investment, it is significantly positive except for 
large firms in non-manufacturing industries. The marginal q has significantly positive 
effect on borrowing only for medium firms in manufacturing industries and large firms 
in non-manufacturing industries. Insignificance of marginal q variable in borrowing 
equation of small firms is consistent with the importance of agency cost rather than the 
fundamental profitability for small firms.    
                                                        
13 See Ogawa(2000a) for detailed procedure to construct marginal q series.  
14 Details of the estimation results are given in Appendix Tables.  
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Estimates of Agency Cost 
    Figure 1 and 2 show the estimates of agency cost from the first quarter of 1976 to 
the first quarter of 1998 for manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries, 
respectively. The agency cost is normalized at 100 in the first quarter of 1976. What is 
common to all firms is an increasing trend of agency cost in the 90s when land price 
plummeted. We also observe a declining trend of agency cost in the late 80s for small 
and medium firms in manufacturing industries and small and large firms in 
non-manufacturing industries. Note that land price soared noticeably in the late 80s. The 
agency cost started to fall at the beginning of the 80s for large firms in manufacturing 
industries. Development of financial markets starting from the 80s lowered agency cost 
and thus enabled large manufacturing firms to finance from a variety of sources cheaply, 
leading to fall of agency cost.  
 
Association of Agency Cost with Firms’ Activities 
    We turn to the relationship of agency cost with firms’ attributes and activities such 
as investment, borrowing, land asset, and interest rate spread. It can be seen by the 
product of agency cost with the corresponding parameters.15  
The effect of agency cost on investment is shown in Figure 3. It is seen that 
increase of agency cost in the 90s depressed investment to a large extent. Note that the 
effect is especially large for small firms. We also observe that fall of agency cost in the 
late 80s is associated with vigorous investment. The effect is notably large for small 
firms in non-manufacturing industries. The effect of agency cost on borrowing is shown 
in Figure 4. It is clear that rise of agency cost in the 90s drastically reduced borrowing 
of small firms. Conversely fall of agency cost in the late 80s led to an increase of 
borrowing of small firms. It should be noted that borrowing of large firms are 
unaffected by the agency cost. Figure 5 shows the association of interest rate spread 
with agency cost. We see that the interest rate spread of large firms is most affected by 
the agency cost. In the 80s the interest rate spread tends to decline due to fall of agency 
cost, while the interest rate spread exhibits an increasing trend in the 90s, reflecting a 
rise of agency cost. Lastly Figure 6 shows the association of agency cost with land asset. 
We see that agency cost is closely related to the value of land asset. In the late 80s the 
soaring land price contributed to reducing agency cost, while the agency cost rose 
                                                        
15 The computed values in the subsequent figures are normalized by subtracting the computed value 
at the first quarter of 1976 from the values in the subsequent period. Therefore, the computed values  
are normalized to zero at the first quarter of 1976. 
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sharply in the 90s when the land price plummeted.       
          
6. Concluding Remarks 
In this study we made an attempt to estimate a state space model of investment and 
borrowing in a Bayesian framework and extract the unobservable agency cost of 
Japanese firms by firm size. Our approach seems to be quite successful since we can 
explain the investment and borrowing behavior of firms in the late 80s and 90s by the 
movement of agency cost. We find that the agency cost exhibited a declining trend in 
the late 80s and an increasing trend in the 90s irrespective of firm size. We can pin 
down the driving force of agency cost to be the market value of land. Furthermore, we 
find that investment and borrowing behavior of small firms is very much affected by 
their agency cost in the late 80s and 90s. In particular our results can shed light on the 
cause of stagnancy of business activities of small firms in the 90s. In the 90s land price 
plummeted and collateral value of land fell drastically, which in turn affected severely 
investment and borrowing of small firms by raising their agency cost. Our evidence 
demonstrates that imperfection of capital market is notable for small firms in Japan.                  
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Fixed Investment Rate by Firm Size 
                                                                          (%) 
 
 
 
 
75:2-86:4       87:1-91:1      91:2-98:1 
 
75:2-98:1 
Manufacturing 
Industries 
Small firms  
 
Medium firms 
 
Large firms 
 
 
 
  4.10           4.47           2.69 
 
  3.72           4.03           2.69 
  
  3.58           3.90           3.00 
 
 
 
   3.74 
  (0.98) 
   3.47 
  (0.74) 
   3.46 
  (0.63) 
Non-manufacturing 
Industries 
Small firms 
 
Medium firms 
 
Large firms 
 
 
 
  4.19           5.40           3.19 
 
  4.24           4.38           3.29 
  
  4.02           4.78           3.77 
 
 
 
   4.11 
  (0.99) 
   3.98 
  (0.69) 
   4.09 
  (0.58) 
     Notes: The values in parentheses are standard deviation. 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics of the Rate of Change in Total Borrowing by Firm Size 
                                                                          (%) 
 
 
 
 
75:2-86:4       87:1-91:1      91:2-98:1 
 
75:2-98:1 
Manufacturing 
Industries 
Small firms  
 
Medium firms 
 
Large firms 
 
 
 
  1.23           2.27           0.31 
 
  0.42           1.19           0.26 
  
-0.23          -0.58           0.07 
 
 
 
   1.14 
  (1.37) 
   0.51 
  (0.91) 
  -0.21 
  (1.39) 
Non-manufacturing 
Industries 
Small firms 
 
Medium firms 
 
Large firms 
 
 
 
  1.92           4.02           0.49 
 
  1.49           2.75           0.33 
  
  0.89           2.77          -0.15 
 
 
 
   1.87 
  (1.61) 
   1.37 
  (1.39) 
   0.92 
  (1.48) 
     Notes: The values in parentheses are standard deviation. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics of the Rate of Change in Land Stock at Market Price by Firm Size 
                                                                          (%) 
 
 
 
 
75:2-86:4       87:1-91:1      91:2-98:1 
 
75:2-98:1 
Manufacturing 
Industries 
Small firms  
 
Medium firms 
 
Large firms 
 
 
 
  1.14           4.56          -2.45 
 
  0.97           4.12          -2.50 
  
  1.05           4.22          -2.47 
 
 
 
   0.68 
  (2.97) 
   0.52  
  (2.85) 
   0.56 
  (2.86) 
Non-manufacturing 
Industries 
Small firms 
 
Medium firms 
 
Large firms 
 
 
 
  1.23           4.67          -2.14 
 
  1.03           4.40          -2.29 
  
  1.03           4.44          -2.10 
 
 
 
   0.84 
  (2.89) 
   0.64 
  (2.86) 
   0.71 
  (2.81) 
     Notes: The values in parentheses are standard deviation. 
 
Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics of Marginal q by Firm Size 
                                                                           
 
 
 
 
75:4-86:4       87:1-91:1      91:2-98:1 
 
75:4-98:1 
Manufacturing 
Industries 
Small firms  
 
Medium firms 
 
Large firms 
 
 
 
  1.66           1.92           0.93 
 
  1.09           1.06           0.64 
  
  0.96           1.06           0.75 
 
 
   1.47 
  (0.47) 
   0.95  
  (0.28) 
   0.91 
  (0.22) 
Non-manufacturing 
Industries 
Small firms 
 
Medium firms 
 
Large firms 
 
 
 
  1.54           1.94           1.16 
 
  0.91           0.98           0.48 
  
  0.80           0.93           0.57 
 
 
 
   1.49 
  (0.36) 
   0.79 
  (0.27) 
   0.75 
  (0.17) 
     Notes: The values in parentheses are standard deviation. 
 
Figure 1. Agency Cost of Manufacturing Industries ( 1976 Q1 = 100 )
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Figure 2. Agency Cost of Non-Manufacturing Industries ( 1976 Q1 = 100 )
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Figure 3. Effect of Agency cost on Investment Rate
( 1976 Q1 = 0 )
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Figure 4. Effect of Agency cost on Borrowing Ratio
( 1976 Q1 = 0 )
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Figure 5. Effect of Agency cost on Interest Rate Spread
( 1976 Q1 = 0 )
(a) Manufacturing Industries
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Figure 6. Effect of Ratio of Land Asset to Tangible Asset on Agency cost
( 1976 Q1 = 0 )
(a) Manufacturing Industries
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Appendix Tables
Bayesian Prior and Posterior Distribution:
Agency Cost Model of Investment and Borrowing
Table A-1 . Manufacturing Small Firms  ?
Prior Posterior Distribution
Parameters mean S.D. mean S.D. median 95%bands CD


0 1 1.066 0.081 1.068 ( 0.893 1.226 ) 0.006


0 1 0.023 0.074 0.025 ( -0.143 0.162 ) 0.001


0 1 -0.001 0.068 0.001 ( -0.134 0.138 ) -0.014


0 1 -0.133 0.053 -0.136 ( -0.224 -0.030 ) 0.013


0 1 -0.141 0.028 -0.140 ( -0.202 -0.090 ) -0.072


0 1 -0.217 0.046 -0.216 ( -0.317 -0.141 ) -0.015


0 1 -1.008 0.215 -0.984 ( -1.475 -0.621 ) -0.073


0 1 0.039 0.013 0.037 ( 0.018 0.068 ) 0.034


0 1 0.983 0.176 1.005 ( 0.589 1.281 ) 0.016


0 1 0.366 0.280 0.397 ( -0.224 0.823 ) 0.051



2 4 0.206 0.020 0.205 ( 0.170 0.248 ) -0.009



2 4 1.290 0.096 1.287 ( 1.103 1.494 ) 0.032



60 20 19.897 1.940 20.049 ( 15.82 23.83 ) -0.014



2 4 0.339 0.018 0.339 ( 0.303 0.376 ) -0.026
Note  The first 1000 iterations of Gibbs sampler are discarded to guarantee convergence and
the next 5000 iterations are taken as our sample. As butch mean, an average of each 10 successive
draws of the original sample is regarded as one sample of target posterior distribution.
 See eqs. (5) and (6) for the notations of parameters.
 S.D. refers to standard deviation.
 95 % bands refers to 95 % posterior probability bands.
 The convergence diagnostic (CD) statistics is derived from the i-th draw of a parameter 
in the recorded 5000 draws. The statistics is defined as    




	







	


, where 













,









			
		




, and







,







are standard deviation of



,



. Here we set 

  and 

 . CD of converged posterior distribution must be
asymptotically standard normal distribution. (See Geweke (1992). )
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Table A-2 . Manufacturing Medium Firms
Prior Posterior Distribution
parameter mean S.D. mean S.D. median 95%bands CD


0 1 1.063 0.075 1.068 ( 0.889 1.195 ) -0.067


0 1 0.026 0.075 0.030 ( -0.120 0.163 ) 0.015


0 1 -0.011 0.071 -0.012 ( -0.148 0.126 ) -0.013


0 1 -0.138 0.049 -0.140 ( -0.240 -0.039 ) 0.045


0 1 -0.109 0.027 -0.106 ( -0.169 -0.059 ) -0.217


0 1 -0.108 0.031 -0.104 ( -0.184 -0.055 ) -0.197


0 1 -1.117 0.195 -1.114 ( -1.535 -0.748 ) -0.157


0 1 0.031 0.011 0.030 ( 0.013 0.056 ) 0.092


0 1 1.704 0.159 1.720 ( 1.294 1.952 ) -0.093


0 1 0.642 0.175 0.662 ( 0.196 0.918 ) -0.117



2 4 0.181 0.017 0.181 ( 0.151 0.215 ) -0.078



2 4 0.417 0.036 0.420 ( 0.348 0.489 ) -0.103



60 20 19.018 2.579 18.900 ( 14.83 24.13 ) 0.110



2 4 0.256 0.014 0.256 ( 0.230 0.283 ) 0.051
Note: See the note of Table A-1.
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Table A-3 . Manufacturing Large Firms?
Prior Posterior Distribution
parameter mean S.D. mean S.D. median 95%bands CD


0 1 1.085 0.071 1.087 ( 0.936 1.217 ) 0.076


0 1 0.028 0.076 0.029 ( -0.117 0.177 ) -0.049


0 1 0.007 0.072 0.010 ( -0.137 0.145 ) -0.011


0 1 -0.157 0.051 -0.157 ( -0.255 -0.059 ) 0.019


0 1 -0.060 0.014 -0.059 ( -0.088 -0.038 ) 0.109


0 1 0.021 0.009 0.021 ( 0.002 0.041 ) -0.004


0 1 -0.918 0.175 -0.908 ( -1.290 -0.608 ) 0.108


0 1 0.155 0.032 0.153 ( 0.097 0.223 ) -0.101


0 1 1.093 0.098 1.099 ( 0.893 1.275 ) 0.024


0 1 -0.229 0.118 -0.234 ( -0.462 0.020 ) -0.012



2 4 0.306 0.027 0.309 ( 0.247 0.353 ) -0.025



2 4 0.694 0.034 0.693 ( 0.630 0.761 ) 0.0415



60 20 19.449 2.695 19.720 ( 14.41 24.27 ) 0.0137



2 4 0.258 0.071 0.237 ( 0.167 0.432 ) -0.001
Note: See the note of Table A-1.
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Table A-4 . Non-Manufacturing Small Firms?
Prior Posterior Distribution
parameter mean S.D. mean S.D. median 95%bands CD


0 1 1.092 0.092 1.098 ( 0.871 1.248 ) 0.136


0 1 0.009 0.076 0.009 ( -0.142 0.162 ) 0.028


0 1 -0.014 0.074 -0.014 ( -0.154 0.135 ) -0.038


0 1 -0.114 0.071 -0.119 ( -0.259 0.027 ) -0.116


0 1 -0.142 0.034 -0.141 ( -0.217 -0.080 ) 0.279


0 1 -0.550 0.143 -0.542 ( -0.864 -0.301 ) 0.283


0 1 -0.948 0.230 -0.935 ( -1.451 -0.554 ) 0.262


0 1 -0.007 0.006 -0.007 ( -0.020 0.004 ) 0.037


0 1 0.786 0.130 0.788 ( 0.539 1.046 ) -0.030


0 1 0.156 0.316 0.178 ( -0.495 0.756 ) -0.033



2 4 0.247 0.015 0.247 ( 0.218 0.277 ) 0.025



2 4 3.201 0.253 3.208 ( 2.706 3.712 ) 0.071



60 20 14.47 0.83 14.48 ( 12.88 16.19 ) -0.075



2 4 0.413 0.021 0.411 ( 0.373 0.458 ) -0.031
Note: See the note of Table A-1.
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Table A-5 . Non-Manufacturing Medium Firms?
Prior Posterior Distribution
parameter mean S.D. mean S.D. median 95%bands CD


0 1 0.980 0.120 0.994 ( 0.705 1.181 ) -0.064


0 1 0.076 0.091 0.072 ( -0.091 0.282 ) 0.026


0 1 -0.020 0.076 -0.019 ( -0.178 0.125 ) -0.001


0 1 -0.075 0.071 -0.078 ( -0.203 0.084 ) 0.035


0 1 -0.088 0.020 -0.086 ( -0.134 -0.055 ) -0.146


0 1 -0.492 0.114 -0.470 ( -0.758 -0.310 ) -0.160


0 1 -0.731 0.172 -0.713 ( -1.120 -0.436 ) -0.115


0 1 0.070 0.024 0.066 ( 0.036 0.123 ) 0.053


0 1 1.049 0.180 1.038 ( 0.710 1.429 ) -0.045


0 1 0.069 0.735 0.017 ( -1.201 1.599 ) -0.045



2 4 0.220 0.012 0.220 ( 0.196 0.245 ) 0.043



2 4 1.089 0.111 1.084 ( 0.875 1.335 ) 0.043



60 20 27.430 1.852 27.232 ( 24.07 31.58 ) -0.0087



2 4 0.352 0.026 0.353 ( 0.298 0.400 ) 0.007
Note: See the note of Table A-1.
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Table A-6 . Non-Manufacturing Large Firms?
Prior Posterior Distribution
parameter mean S.D. mean S.D. median 95%bands CD


0 1 1.118 0.075 1.122 ( 0.961 1.260 ) -0.063


0 1 0.033 0.073 0.035 ( -0.117 0.172 ) 0.028


0 1 0.014 0.070 0.018 ( -0.123 0.155 ) -0.015


0 1 -0.194 0.057 -0.196 ( -0.302 -0.077 ) 0.041


0 1 -0.082 0.017 -0.081 ( -0.123 -0.049 ) -0.111


0 1 -0.082 0.019 -0.081 ( -0.124 -0.048 ) -0.091


0 1 -0.976 0.217 -0.962 ( -1.487 -0.586 ) -0.083


0 1 0.078 0.021 0.076 ( 0.042 0.122 ) 0.085


0 1 0.357 0.219 0.361 ( -0.089 0.747 ) -0.032


0 1 2.734 0.373 2.720 ( 1.946 3.456 ) -0.036



2 4 0.177 0.011 0.177 ( 0.156 0.199 ) 0.010



2 4 1.130 0.066 1.127 ( 1.013 1.271 ) 0.007



60 20 13.467 0.763 13.466 ( 12.03 15.03 ) 0.004



2 4 0.432 0.028 0.430 ( 0.381 0.491 ) -0.062
Note: See the note of Table A-1.
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